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Introduction
In September 2012, France published plans to increase taxes on investment income and to restrict the deductibility of interest expenses from the corporate tax base. This announcement led to a massive complaining by fund managers. They stated this would mean the death of private equity in France. 3 One reason for this reaction is that especially acquisitions undertaken by private equity companies are often mainly debt nanced. This results in a very large amount of interest expenses according to the large dealvalues of acquisitions of whole companies.
In my sample, there are indeed many acquirers showing a strong increase in the interest expenses after the deal. For example, the interest expenses of Linde AG raised from 145 million to 271 million EUR after the mainly debt nanced acquisition of BOC Group in 2006 because of the large dealvalue amounting 12.2 billion EUR. Another example is the acquisition of Cumerio sa/nv by Norddeutsche Anerie AG in 2008 valued at 543.7 million EUR. The net interest expenses increased from 1.4 million EUR before the deal to 20.3 million EUR after the deal. 4 As a consequence, a restriction of the deductibility of such expenses may signicantly increase the tax burden of acquiring companies. The question is why the fraction of debt nancing is so high in some corporate acquisitions. Is it mainly because in large deals it is not possible to issue enough equity for the nancing or is there a tax eect? Since tax deductibility creates an interest tax shield, there might be an incentive to use debt as a nancing method from a tax point of view. This debt bias is already known and investigated in the empirical literature 5 and overindebtedness has received increased attention during the recent nancial crisis 6 . Mergers and acquisitions are a special case of on average large investments and have experienced increasing importance with respect to foreign direct investment in the last decades. Therefore, I analyze to what extend the nancing decision in corporate acquisitions and the capital structure of acquiring companies are inuenced by prot taxation.
I contribute to the literature by analyzing the tax eects on the nancing decision in corporate acquisitions in a sample of several, mainly European acquirer countries. In addition, I combine an analysis of the specic deal nancing decisions and of the overall 3 Compare Chassany (2012) . 4 Compare Linde (2006) and Norddeutsche Anerie (2009) for these gures. 5 Compare the metastudy by Feld et al. (2013) , for example. 6 Compare Liu and Rosenberg (2013) 7 Compare Desai and Hines (2003). capital structure development of the acquiring companies in the acquisition period. My main nding is that higher tax rates indeed increase the debt to assets ratios of the acquirers in the acquisition period. Looking at deals between 2001 and 2011 with an acquirer in one of 21 European countries, I nd that a one %-point raising statutory tax rate is associated with an increase of the debt ratio by 0.55 %-points. Furthermore, the probaility to observe an at least partly debt nanced deal increases on average by 1.58 %-points for all acquirers and by 2.03 %-points for the subsample of protable acquirers if the tax rate increases by one %-point.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the recent empirical literatur, section 3 develops the main hypotheses and section 4 describes the data. Section 5 illustrates the empirical aproach, section 6 presents the results and nally section 7 concludes.
Literature Review
In the empirical literature there exist many studies analyzing the eects of taxes on the capital structure of companies. Most of them nd a positive relationship between the tax rate and the debt to assets ratio. Those studies vary in the type of proxy for the marginal tax advantage of debt, the empirical methods used and the types of rms they are investigating. While some studies only looked at one country (for example Graham et al (1998) and Graham (1999) which use simulated marginal tax rates of US corporations), other authors examined tax eects across several countries (e.g. Rajan and Zingales (1995) ). While some studies focus on domestic rms (e.g. Altshuler and Grubert (2003) ), others analyze the nancing decisions of multinational companies(e.g. Overesch and Voeller (2010) and Huizinga et al. (2008) ). Overviews can be found in Auerbach(2002) , Graham(2003) and a meta-study by Feld et al. (2013) .
As Desai and Hines (2003) point out, the share of mergers and acquisitions in foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased signicantly in the last decades and in the meantime has become the largest part of FDI underlining the economic importance of such kind of investment. Concerning the nancing decision of corporate acquisitions there are already several papers dealing with non-tax determinants of the method of payment. Those studies like Amihud et al. (1990) , Martin (1996) and Gosh and Ruland (1998) examine the role of growth opportunities, managerial ownership or cash availability of the acquirer. Analyzing deals within Europe, Faccio and Masulis (2005) also investigate the countervailing eects of corporate control of managers and existing shareholders that will decrease by stock nancing and the nancing constraints linked to debt. Using mergers of publicly listed US rms, Ismail and Krause (2010) nd a signicant impact of the correlation of acquirer and target pre-deal returns, weather the merger is hostile and of defense mechanisms for the acquirer on the method of payment. Bi and Gregory (2011) focus on the overvaluation of acquirers. Madura and Ngo (2012) analyze acquisitions of private rms and nd an information asymmetry eect.
The rst study investigating the tax advantage of debt nancing in corporate acquisitions is Erickson (1998) . The author distinguishes between 100 % debt nanced cash deals and 100 % equity nanced stock deals in the US and nds that higher tax rates increase the probability to observe a debt nanced deal. He uses a trichotomous tax variable capturing if the acquirer is near tax exhaustion. As an alternative measure, he uses an indicator variable for a net operating loss. Dhaliwal et al. (2005) also analyze US deals but take into account the possibility to nance a corporate acquisition by retained earnings. That is why the authors only look at cash deals. The main nding in this study ist that the rules concerning the foreign tax credit limitations in the US signicantly inuence the decision to use debt or internal funds for the nancing of a cash deal. Gosh et al. (2011) do not nd robust eects of taxes on the debt issuance of US acquirers in the years after an acquisition using a panel approach.
In contrast to former studies, I examine deals in many countries mainly in Europe. Furthermore, I analyze both public and private rms and the acquisitions labeled as equity nanced in my sample can be both cash deals and share deals. Besides the investigation of the probability to observe a debt nanced deal I also evaluate the development of the acquirers' debt ratios during the deal period. I nd empirical evidence for a higher probability of debt nancing if the acquirer faces a high tax rate and for the impact of tax rates on the capital strucure around the deal. Moreover, I investigate the specic tax incentives for multinational companies.
3 Development of Hypotheses Graham (2003) summarizes the main ndings of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and (1963) and Miller (1977) : If an investment is purely equity nanced, the net earnings will be taxed with the corporate income tax rate τ C at the company level and in addition dividends will be taxed at the shareholder level with the personal income tax rate τ P . If the investment is instead debt nanced, the interest payments to the capital provider are not taxed at the company level because they are deductibly from the corporate tax base. However, such payments are taxed at the level of the capital provider with the interest tax rate τ I . Therefore, the dierence in the tax burden between equity and debt nancing of an investment with net earnings equal to the interest expenses is
where r is the interest rate, D is the amount of debt and rD is the amount of interest payments, accordingly. For simplicity, we now assume that τ P and τ I equal zero. In reality personal taxes might be irrelevant for the nancing decision if the company is very large and has diversied shareholders in dierent countries and dierent tax brackets. Then the management does not know and cannot take into account the taxation of individual shareholders and just consider corporate taxation. 8 In that case equation (1) reduces to
(2)
In this equation we see immediately that the theoretical tax advantage of debt increases in the statutory corporate income tax rate. Of course there are also negative aspects of debt nancing. Several studies modeled these disadvantages explaining why we do not observe 100 % debt nanced companies, for example nancial distress costs or the restricted access to the capital market due to excess demand or insucient collaterals.
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But even if we control for these issues, the tax rate is supposed to inuence the nancing decision of corporations. This theory can be adopted for corporate acquisitions. An acquisition brings benets by yielding synergies. In contrast, the acquirer has to bear the costs. If the deal is equity nanced, the cash cannot be used for dividend distribution or the acquirer has to pay with own shares which reduces the inuence in the own company. If the deal is nanced by debt, the interest expenses lower the distributable prots in the future and reduce the nancial room to maneuver. The acquirer tries to minimize the costs of the acquisition. Debt nancing can be part of that strategy if the deductiblitiy of interest expenses helps saving taxes. Thus, ceteris paribus a higher tax rate should positively inuence the probability to use debt for the deal nancing as the tax savings increase in the tax rate. Using variation of statutory tax rates over countries and over time I state the rst hypothesis:
8 In my analysis, I focus on the company taxation for the same reasons and employ personal taxation only in sensitivity analyses. 9 Compare Graham (2003) for an overview. H 1. Acquirer companies in high tax countries have a higher probability to use debt to nance a corporate acquisition than companies in low tax countries.
In addition to the specic decision how to nance the acquisition, I analyze the capital structure change of the acquiring company during the deal period. By considering the development of the debt to assets ratio of the acquirer I take into account that the decision about the nancing of the acquisition might not be independent from other investments undertaken in the same period. Furthermore, looking at the change of the debt ratio also gives information about how much debt is used in the acquisition period whereas in the analysis of the probability to observe a debt nanced deal I do not know the fraction of debt nancing. Concerning the capital structure, I state the following hypothesis:
H 2. The debt to assets ratio of acquirers in high tax countries should increase during the acquisition period compared to acquiring companies in low tax countries.
An acquisition is an additional investment, hence the marginal tax rate is relevant for the nancing decision. If additional interest expenses do not further reduce the tax base, there is no incentive for debt nancing from a tax point of view. This situation is named "tax exhaustion" in the Literatur.
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The proposed tax eect should thus especially be observed for companies having taxable prots that can be reduced by additional interest expenses. In contrast, loss making acquirers have no incentive to save taxes. Therefore I state the third hypothesis:
H 3. The eect of taxes on the probability to observe a debt nanced deal and the eect on the debt ratio depends on the prot or loss situation of the acquiring company.
The hypotheses derived above are valid for both, purely domestic and multinational companies. Moreover, for multinationals there are additional tax aspects of corporate acquisitions. Facing dierent tax systems and rates in the countries their subsidiaries are located in, the opportunities for tax planning are various. Multinationals are found to have incentives for higher internal and overall debt ratios compared to national rms especially if they are majority-owned 11 and to use tax rate dierences for prot shifting 12 . Ruf (2010) summarizes the tax structuring options in international acquisitions. Generally, multinationals can decide to acquire a given target company through an acquisition vehicle in the target country or by a subsidiary in a dierent country. In the rst case, the 10 Compare MacKie-Mason (1990), for example. 11 Compare Schindler and Schjelderup (2010) . 12 Compare Møen et al and Huizinga et al. (2008). prots of the target company can be oset by interest expenses for a debt nanced aquisition if the target country applies a group taxation regime that allows for tax consolidation of dierent entities belonging to the same group. In addition, the acquiring company can use potential past losses of the target company in order to reduce its taxable prots if tax consolidation is possibe. This might reduce the incentive to use debt for the deal nancing as the loss carry-forward of the target is a non-debt tax shield and decreases the need to further reduce the taxable income of the acquirer by additional interest expenses.
Furthermore, a multinational can use tax rate dierences within the group to reduce the acquisition costs. If a subsidiary in a high tax country takes out a loan for the acquisition of a target company in a low tax country, the costs for the acquisition, which are the interest expenses, are deductible from the tax base in a high tax country and the earnings from the acquisition, which are the increased prots of the target company due to synergies, are taxable in a low tax country. In addition, a subsidiary in a low tax country can provide a loan to the acquisition vehicle in the high tax country. Then, there is an additional tax saving because interest expenses are decucted in the high tax country (acquiring subsidiary) but interest earnings are taxable in a low tax country (loan providing subsidiary). This leads to the next hypothesis: H 4. The nancing decision of multinational companies in the acquisition period is inuenced by a possible group taxation and dierent tax rates within the multinational group.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
I use rm-level data from ZEPHYR and AMADEUS, two databases of Bureau van Dijk. ZEPHYR provides information about mergers and acquisitions in several countries around the world and the involved parties since 1996. I use all mergers and acquisitions through which the acquirer company gets a majority stakeholding in the target company and which was completed between 1998 and 2011. For the analysis I keep all observations where the acquirer and target companies are corporations and where the industry is not public administration, nancial industry, activities of housholds as employers or activities of extraterritorial organisations. AMADEUS is a rm-level database providing unconsolidated accounting data of European companies. In my nal sample I drop observations with implausible values for the nancial variables such as prot, size, EBIT, market cap-italization, equity, depreciation, nancial result and debt ratio. For the analysis of the probability to observe a debt nanced deal the dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the deal is debt nanced and zero if not. The information is collected from three variables in the ZEPHYR database. From the variable DEAL FINANCING I use entries such as vendor placing, leveraged buy out and new bank facilites. Vendor placing means that the seller of the target company becomes a shareholder of the acquiring company after the deal and is an indicator for equity nancing. The other two entries are indicators for debt nancing. A second variable, METHOD OF PAYMENT, contains entries such as shares which indicates equity nancing and loan notes and debt assumed which indicate debt nancing. In addition, this variable reports if the acquisition price is at least partly paid with cash. In a third variable, DEAL SUBTYPE, that mainly describes the kind of the deal I also sometimes nd the entry leveraged buy out. With this information I contruct in a rst step an indicator for an at least partly debt nanced deal, Debt i,j , which equals one if I nd one or more of the entries leveraged buy out, new bank facilites, loan notes or debt assumed and zero if none of these information is given but at least one of the ZEPHYR variables provide some information about the deal nancing or method of payment. In my base sample 18.8 % of deals are labeled as debt nanced according to this denition. Erickson (1998) distinguishes between 100 % debt nanced and 100 % equity nanced deals. That is why I dene in a second step DebtB i,j . With this variable I also try to separate debt nanced cash deals and equity nanced stock deals. DebtB i,j equals one in the same cases like Debt i,j but only if the deal is no vendor placing and the method of payment is not shares. It only equals zero if vendor placing, shares, or cash and no note about debt nancing is given. For some acquisitions I only have the information that cash was used as a method of payment. Those observations cannot be classied into debt or equity nanced deals certainly. Therefore, I employ DebtC i,j , which excludes these deals.
This leads to an increase of the fraction of debt nanced deals to 43.8 %.
In contrast to Erickson (1998) , Dhaliwal et al. (2005) only look at cash deals. Therefore, 13 Deals where the acquirer shows pre-or post deal prots > thousand EUR 1.0e+07 or < thousand EUR -1.0e+07, total assets < 0 or >= thousand EUR 1.0e+09, ebit < thousand EUR -1.0e+07 or >= thousand EUR 1.0e+09, market capitalization < 0 or >= thousand EUR 1.0e+10, shareholder funds < 0 or >= thousand EUR 1.0e+09, D&A i < 0 or >= 1, net interest result to assets ratio < 0 or > 1 or debt to assets ratio < 0 are excluded from the anaysis.
I also try to idendify the method of nancing for cash deals. For this reason I redene Debt i,j and DebtB i,j and only used deals where the variable METHOD OF PAYMENT contains cash. Surprisingly, the fraction of debt nanced deals remains at a very low level of about 14-15 % although in the study of Dhaliwal et al. (2005) about two third of cash deals were mainly debt nanced. This result in my opinion indicates a data problem regarding the identication of cash deals and I therefore abstain from using these variables in the further empirical analysis. Table 1 sumarizes descriptive statistics of the dependent variables for the analysis of the probability to observe a debt nanced deal. The last two collums show the dierence of the average tax rate, φτ C acq (see section 4.2 for details of the tax variables), between debt nanced and equity nanced acquisitions according to the employed denitions and the corrresponding p-values using a standard t-test with unequal variances. For all denitions, the average tax rate is slightly higher for debt nanced deals with a statistically signicant dierence. This is a rst hint for a potential tax eect on the nancing decision. For the acquiring company's capital structure analysis the dependent variable is ∆ Debt i,j which is dened as the dierence between the year-end debt to assets ratio of the acquirer after the acquisition and the corresponding pre-deal value. The gures used to calculate this variable stem from unconsolidated statements of the respective acquiring company. The empirical link betweeen the nancing decision for the acquisitions in my sample and the development of the capital structure is given by two facts. First, the change in the debt ratio is signicantly higher in debt nanced deals than in equity nanced deals according to all of my denitions of the indicator for debt nancing using a standard t-test with unequal variances. Second, a univariate analysis between the development of the debt ratio and the logarithm of the sum of dealvalues per acquirer in the considered period results in a positive and signicant correlation. Therefore, it seems to be reasonable to analyse the capital structure of the acquiring companies during the deal period to better understand the nancing decisions with respect to acquisitions.
In the base sample with 4389 acquirer-company year observations, the debt ratio increases on average by 2.3 %-points during the deal period. The fraction of acquirers that increase their debtratio is 57.3 %. The fraction of debt ratio increasers is only 56.6 % in the group of low tax acquirers (rst quartile, i.e. φτ C acq < 26 %) and 60.4 % for companies facing a relative high tax (last quartile, φτ C acq > 33 %). The average tax rate for increasers is 0.3 %-points higher than for decreasers. This is only a small dierence but it is statistically signicant on the 10 %-level and a rst hint for a relationship between the tax advantage of debt nancing and the nancing decision regarding corporate acquisitions.
Tax data
For the empirical analysis, I use tax data on the corporate and personal taxation in the year of the completion date in the respective acquirer country.
14 τ C acq is the corporate income tax rate that combines national and local taxes. Since in some countries interest expenses are only deductible from the base of certain taxes 15 , the tax advantage of debt nancing as depicted in equation (1) reduces to
where (1 − φ) is the fraction of φτ C acq , for which interest deductibility is not possible. Accordingly, the tax advantage of debt reduces to Overesch and Voeller (2010) use this data as well and describe the composition of the tax rates in detail. 15 For example, in Germany interest expenses are fully deductible from the corporate income tax base but only partly from the local business tax (Gewerbesteuer). independent variables. The asignment of personal tax rates to countries is executed by using the acquirer country. In reality there might of course be many companies having shareholders abroad. Since I do not know where the shareholders of the specic companies live I cannot be sure that my tax rates really capture the personal tax burden. However, relying on the literature of home bias in investment decisions (e.g. French and Poterba (1991) ) this procedure seems to be reasonable. Grouptax is an indicator variable that equals one if the acquirer and the target company are located in the same country and the target country applies a group taxation regime which allows an osetting of prots and losses of dierent entities within one group of companies for tax purposes.
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If the acquirer company can oset losses arising due to high interest expenses after a debt nanced deal with prots of the target, the probability to observe a debt nanced deal should be higher. If a protable acquirer can use an existing loss carry-forward of the target company to reduce its taxable income, the eect is supposed to be negative because the loss serves as a non-debt tax shield.
tar is the dierence between the acquirer and the target country tax rate.
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The higher this dierence, the higher is the incentive to use debt for the nancing of the acquisition because acquisition costs (interest expenses for the loan taken out for the deal) reduce the tax base in a high tax country and the gains from the acquisition (increasing prots in the target company due to synergies) are taxable in a low tax country.
Finally, I control for the weighted average tax rate of the whole multinational group in the acquisition year, φτ C mean . The mean is weighted by the numbers of aliates per country.
19
Thus, a high value of this variable indicates that the multinational group is a high tax group because it mainly consists of subsidiaries in high tax countries. A higher average group tax rate is supposed to positively inuence the probability to observe a debt nanced deal because it is possible for other aliates to take out a loan and then provide the money to the aquiring subsidiary in the form of equity. For the debt ratio analysis I use the weighted average tax rate of all aliates outside the acquirer country, 16 As I only have access to the current ownership structure of the acquiring companies in 2012, the multinational status does not vary over time. Thus, I might classify acquirers to be part of a multinational group although they were purely domestic in the year of the acquisition. 17 Compare Dreÿler and Overesch (2013) for details of this variable. They generate and employ this indicator for years 1996 -2007. I used the same variable and added information for years 2008 -2011. For the debt ratio analysis I use Grouptax2 which equals one if at least one target company is located in the acquirer country and group taxation is possible. 18 For the debt ratio analysis I use the dierence between the acquirer country tax rate and the average tax rate of the targets aquired in the considered period, φτ
tarmean . 19 I employ tax rates from 190 countries for this analysis and asign it to the respective 50 % corporate shareholders and subsidiaries. As I only have access to the current ownership structures in 2012, there might be aliates in the multinational group which were not part of the group in the year of acquisition. By using the weighted means the bias by a missclassication of single aliates should not be too large.
φτ C mean outside , and interact this variable with φτ C acq . A negative interaction eect indicates that the incentive to reduce the taxable income of the acquiring company by debt nancing is higher if there are no other aliates in high tax counties where the debt would lead to higher tax savings. Moreover, the multinational has a stronger incentive to provide an intragroup loan to the acquiring company by a low tax subsidiary for tax saving purposes if there are many low tax aliates in the group. Denitions of all tax variables can be found in Table 10 in the Appendix and summary statistics are depicted in Table 3 .
Control variables
The variables used in my analysis are listed in Table 10 in the Appendix. The following subsections describe in detail the control variables on the rm-and the country-level.
Firm-level data
In the empirical analysis I control for several rm-level variables coming from unconsolidated statements. The logarithm of the dealvalue in thousand EUR of deal j, Ln Dealvalue j , is supposed to positively inuence the probability to observe a debt nanced deal because in large acquisitions the acquirer has to nd many sources of capital to pay the price for the target company.
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The logarithm of acquirer's i pre-deal total assets in thousand EUR, Size i , is used as a proxy for the size. Larger companies might rather be able to use retained earnings for an acquisition and it is easier for them to issue new equity. As a consequence, larger acquirers are supposed to use less debt in a corporate acquisition. A high pre-deal acquirer debt to assets ratio, Initial debt i , is expected to decrease the probability to observe a debt nanced deal because for highly leveraged companies a further debt issuance might be very costly, for example, if banks demand a higher risk premium. However, a high pre-deal debt ratio might also reect the debt capacitity of the acquirer. Therefore, it can also have a positive impact on the probability to observe a debt nanced deal. Using information about the prots before taxes, I construct an indicator variable for loss making acquiring companies, LCF i . Acquirers without taxable income have no incentive to increase their leverage from a tax point of view. But it might be dicult to issue new equity for loss making rms and therefore they have to go to the capital market and maybe pay higher risk premia.
21
In order to get more observations I match 20 For the analysis of the debt ratio of the acquiring companies during the acquisition period I take the sum of all dealvalues for the acquisitions undertaken by the considered company in the considered year. For the allocation of deals to a considered year I use the date of completion. 21 Compare Erickson (1998) and Dhaliwal et al. (2005) for a detailed discussion of all these variables. the ZEPHYR data with AMADEUS, a database containing information from nancial statements of European companies between. The matching is executed using the acquirer identication number and the year before the completion date of the considered deal. Using these control variables, I get a sample of 3717 deals between 1998 and 2011 with acquirers in 31 countries for the analysis of the probability to observe a debt nanced acquisition and a sample of 4389 acquirers in 34 countries for the debt ratio analysis.
In addition to the afore mentioned controls I use the following variables in my analysis which have a much smaller coverage mainly because most of them are only available in AMADEUS. a lower risk of nancial distress might positively inuence the probability to use debt for nancing an acquisition.
22
In my analysis, I use Altman's (2000) Z-score as a continuous measure of the nancial distress risk. However I do not include the term for retained earnings because I cannot observe this variable in my data. In addition, I exclude the market equity to book debt term like MacKie-Mason (1990) does.
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The variable used in my analysis is Distress i . The higher this variable, the better is the acquirer's nancial situation. The amount of the acquirers' pre-deal depreciation as a fraction of total assets, D&A i , is a non debt tax shield.
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The higher the depreciation the stronger the decrease of the taxable income. As a consequence, one can expect a negative relationship between depreciation and debt nancing. However, a high amount of depreciation may also stand for a large value of replacement investments. Such a company might have to use more debt to nance all of its investments in the considered period. The fraction of tangible assets of the acquirer, Tangibility i , may have a positive impact on debt nancing because a large amount of tangibles serve as collateral. Furthermore, I employ the protability of the acquirer measured by the pre-deal EBITDA devided by total assets, Protability i . I predict a negative relationship between this variable and the probability to observe a debt nanced deal.
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Apart from that, I control for the change in depreciation, tangibility and protability during the deal period (∆ D&A i , ∆ Tangibility i and ∆ Protability i ) to capture the development of these variables over time.
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Geared to former studies (e.g. Erickson (1998) and Dhaliwal et al. (2005) ), I use an indicator for a loss making target company, LCF j , because exisiting loss carry forwards may be oset with future prots and accordingly serve as a non-debt tax shield. In this case the acquirer is expected to use less debt for the acquisition.
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Considering all these additional variables the sample size 22 Compare Gosh et al. (2011) . 23 MacKie-Mason (1990) argues that in an analysis of the capital structure the debt ratio should be considered separately. In addition, I only observe the market value for very few rms. 24 Compare e.g. De Angelo and Masulis (1980) . 25 Compare Overesch and Voeller (2010) and Gosh(2011) for a discussion of the impact of this variable. 26 The change of these variables is computed using the dierence between the post-and pre-deal values in ZEPHYR. For the matching with AMADEUS I use the year of deal completion for post-deal values. 27 For the analysis of the debt ratio of the acquiring companies during the acquisition period I use an reduces to 940 deals and 16 acquirer countries between 2002 and 2011 for the analysis of the probability to observe a debt nanced acquisition and to 1194 acquirers in 21 countries and years 2001 to 2011 for the debt ratio analysis. Table 3 provides summary statistics of the independent variables used in the regression analysis. The number of observations per acquirer country can be found in the Appendix in Table 11 for the analysis of the probability to observe a debt nanced deal and in Table 12 for the debt ratio analysis.
Country level data
Apart from the rm-level data I also control for some time varying acquirer countryspecic variables provided by the Worldbank. Ination acq is supposed to have a positive impact on debt nancing according to De Angelo and Masulis (1980) . They state that ination reduces the real value of tax shields. However, there are studies like Huizinga et al. (2008) nding a negative eect. The authors argue that ination causes uncertainty about the real interest rate. Another factor are the credit market conditions measured by the domestic credit by banks as a percentage of GDP, Domestic credit acq . The hypothesis is that better credit market conditions make it easier to issue new debt for a corporate acquisition. In contrast, high valuation of domestic rms measured by the stock market capitalization of listed rms in percent of the GDP, Stock market acq , may increase the probability to observe an equity nanced deal. The reason is that overvaluation makes rms yielding higher prices for new equity and therefore creates an incentive for equitynancing.
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For the same reason I control for the GDP growth acq . In a prosperous economic environment investors might rather choose to directly participate in companies through the equity capital market. Summary statistics for these variables are depicted in Table 3. indicator that equals one if at least one of the acquired target companies has a loss in the pre-deal period for the acquisitions undertaken by the considered acquirer in the considered year. 28 Compare Myers and Majlut (1984) . . The variables with a lower number of observations are not included in the base specications due to missing data.
Empirical Approach
The rst approach employed in this paper models the probability to observe a debtnanced acquisition. The hypothesis is that higher tax rates increase this proability. In other words, acquirers are supposed to use debt rather than equity if they face higher taxes. The dependent variable in this logit model is an indicator, Debt i,j , that equals one if the deal is at least partly debt nanced and equals zero for fully equity nanced acquisitions. Let J be the number of acquisitions in the sample and
be the unobservable part of the value of acquiring rm i that is determined by the capital structure choice for a given acquisition j, where φτ
are the applicable tax rates in the acquirer country, X i,j is a matrix of control variables, δ c , δ t and δ ind are acquirer-country-, time-and acquirer-industry-dummies 29 and i,j is an extreme value distributed error term. The αs, β and the δs are parameters to be estimated and are dependent from the choice of nancing. Then, the probability to observe a debt nanced deal equals
whereX i,jβ is the right part of equation (6) without i,j . Maximizing the log-likelihood
with respect toβ yields the estimates for the parameters of interest showing the eect of the independent variables on the probability to observe a debt nanced acquisition (debt i,j = 1).
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Alternatively, I take a look at the development of the whole capital structure of the acquiring companies during the deal period. In that case the dependent variable is a continous one, namely the dierence between the debt to assets ratio after and before the deal, ∆ Debt i,j . The main hypothesis here is that higher tax rates create an incentive for acquiring rms to increase their debt ratios during the acquisition period. The 29 Classication into one of 21 industries is conducted by using the rst two digits of the NACE Rev. 2 codes (broad structure, compare Eurostat (2008) ). 30 Compare Green (2012) for equations (7) and (8). specication is the same compared to the logit model:
Now the error term is supposed to be normally distributed and the parameters are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). Those parameters now show the linear relationship between the change in the debt ratio and the independent variables.
6 Regression Results Table 4 shows logit regression results for the analysis of the probability to observe a debt nanced acquisition. The dependent variable is Debt i,j . Column (1) is the baseline regression inlcuding those control variables with a relatively high coverage. The tax advantage of debt, measured by φτ C acq seems not to inuence the probability to observe a debt nanced acquisition. In contrast, some control variables have signicant impact. A higher dealvalue increases the likelihood to use debt for nancing the deal since equity alone might not be sucient. Larger acquirers are less likely to use debt. The reason can be the low costs to issue new equity, for example for listed rms. The negative coecient of the loss dummy, LCF i , indicates that acquirers without taxable income have a lower incentive to use debt for the nancing of a corporate acquisition in order to furhter reduce the tax base. Ination acq has a negative impact, which is in line with ndings in former studies like Huizinga et al. (2008) , and the GDP growth acq rate signicanly lowers the probability for debt nancing which might reect that in good economic times it is easier for rms to issue equity because investors are less risk avers and thus more willing to hold direct interest in companies. The other variables Initial debt i , Domestic credit acq and Stock market acq do not signicantly inuence the nancing decision according to my ndings.
Column (2) repeats the rst regression using a smaller sample where the full set of control variables is not missing. Results now change with respect to the tax variable. The coecient of φτ C acq becomes larger and signicant.
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The results of the control variables are similar to specication (1). Ination acq and GDP growth acq do not show a signicant coecient any more. In contrast, starting from Column (3), Domestic credit acq gets a 31 As several acquirers appear in more than one year all variables are also time-dependent. I abstain from using a subscript for the year for simplicity. 32 The change of the coecient which comes from only reducing the sample size, might reecht, that the results in the whole sample are driven by some outlyers from countries outside Europe or which do not report further information on company-specic variables. The table shows logit regressions with dependent variable Debt i,j . Independent variables are dened in Table 10 . In column (1), the sample consists of domestic and cross border deals between 1998 and 2011 with an acquirer in one of 31 countries. Column (2) restricts the sample to observations where additional control variables are not missing and column (3) adds these controls. In column (4), the sample only consists of protable acquiring companies and in column (5), an interaction term between φτ C acq and LCF i is used to identify a dierence in the tax eect for loss making and protable rms. All specications include acquirer-country-, year-and industry-xed eects. Standard errors are clustered on the acquirer-country-year level. P-values are shown in parentheses. * denotes signicance at the 10 %-level, * * at the 5 %-level and * * * at the 1 %-level. Compare Table 11 for numbers of observations per acquirer country. Table 4 positive and signicant coecient indicating that the access to the capital market is important for the nancing decision, too. Column (3) adds the additional control variables with smaller coverage. Results do not materially change. Except of ∆ Tangibility i , the new variables all do not have any statistically signicant impact on the nancing decision.
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In column (4) I restrict the sample to protable acquirers. That is why the loss dummy, LCF i , cancels out in this specication. The coecient of φτ C acq corresponds to an average marginal eect of 2.03. This means that in my sample a one %-point raising tax rate is on average associated with a 2.03 %-points increase of the probability to observe a debt nanced deal. The average marginal eect for Ln Dealvalue j is 0.08 indicating that a one percent increase in the dealvalue increases the probability to observe a debt nanced deal by 8 %-points. For Size i , the average marginal eect is -0.02. In the last column of Table   4 , I use an interaction term between the tax variable and the loss dummy, φτ C acq * LCF i , to evaluate the dierence of the tax advantage between protable and loss making rms. Since the logit model is non-linear, the coecients and p-values do not show the real interaction eects and results have to be calculated for every observation. 34 Figure 1 shows the real interaction eects and the corresponding z-statistics. As we see, the interaction eect is negative for all observations. However, concerning the signicance, the results are mixed. The interaction eect is only signicant for a smaller part of observations. For a large group of acquisitions especially with small or large predicted probabilities for debt nancing the interaction is insignicant.
Concerning the model t one can take a look at the Sensitivity (Specicity) at the bottom of Table 4 which shows the percentage of correctly predicted debt nanced (non- 33 The negative coecient of ∆ Tangibility i in Column (3) and (5) might reect the non-debt tax shield generated by future depreciation. 34 Compare Ai and Norton (2003) . debt nanced) deals. Another indicator is the %-pts improved gure which shows the additional percentage of deals correctly specied by my model compared to just guessing that all deals are non-debt nanced. For specication (4) this number means that I predict 6.02 %-points more nancing decisions correctly compared to labeling all acquisitions as equity nanced. Table 5 presents results for the ordinary least square debt ratio analysis. The dependent variable here is the change in the debt to assets ratio of the respective acquirer after the deal compared to the pre-deal value, ∆ Debt i,j . Apart from that, specications are identical to Table 4 . The tax variable φτ C acq signicantly inuences the debtratio across all specications. The coecients range between 0.28 and 0.58. The eect in specications containing the full set of controls (column (3)- (5)) is between 0.52 and 0.55. Remarkably, the tax eect seems not to be very dierent for protable and loss making rms. The coecient of the interaction term is insignicant in column (5). If I restrict the sample to protable acquirers in column (4) the coecient becomes even slightly lower. One reason for the insignicant interaction might be that the loss dummy is not a very accurate measure to identify companies without taxable income because my variables come from accounting data which might be dierent from tax data. Another reason can be that I only look at the short run. In the long run even loss making acquirers can be very protable. If they already anticipate this in the acquisiton year, they nevertheless might use debt in order to oset future prots with interest expenses.
In this model, the coecients can directly be interpreted as average marginal eects. Accordingly, the tax coecient in column (4) means that a one %-point tax rate increase is associated with an increase in the change of the debt ratio of 0.53 %-points. In other words, the debt ratio on average increases more or decreases less by 0.53 %-points compared to another acquirer facing a one %-point lower tax rate and being equal in all other considered characteristics.
Coming to the control variables, the dealvalues and the size of the acquiring company have the same expected eects as in the logit analysis. If the sum of dealvalues of all acquisitions undertaken by the considered acquirer increases by one percent the acquirer's debt ratio increases by additional 0.01 %-points according to column (4). The amount of the acquirer's size coecient is similar indicating that the economic importance of those eects is rather small. The pre-deal debt ratio of the acquiring company has a negative impact on the capital structure development. A one %-point higher initial debt ratio decreases the change in the capital structure by 0.22 %-points. Another signicant facor is the stock market capitalization. Stock market acq has the expected negative coecient The table shows OLS regressions with dependent variable ∆ Debt i,j . Independent variables are dened in Table 10 . In column (1), the sample consists of domestic and cross border deals between 1998 and 2011 with an acquirer in one of 34 countries. Column (2) restricts the sample to observations where additional control variables are not missing and column (3) adds these controls. In column (4), the sample only consists of protable acquiring companies and in column (5), an interaction term between φτ C acq and LCF i is used to identify a dierence in the tax eect for loss making and protable rms. All specications include acquirer-country-, year-and industry-xed eects. Standard errors are clustered on the acquirer-country-year level. P-values are shown in parentheses. * denotes signicance at the 10 %-level, * * at the 5 %-level and * * * at the 1 %-level. Compare Table 12 for numbers of observations per acquirer country.
although it is very small from an economic point of view. Distress i positively inuences the change in the debt ratio indicating that acquiring companies facing a lower risk of nancial distress tend to use debt to nance their acquistions. The positive coecient of ∆ D&A i might reect that a new investment increases the need to rely on additional debt nancing. Concerning the tangibility, I nd a positive impact. The protability and especially the change of this variable during the acquisition period inuences the development of the acquirers' capital structure in a negative way. The reason might be that protable rms are rather able to use retained earnings to nance an investment. The other variables, namely Ination acq , Domestic credit acq , GDP growth acq , D&A i , ∆ Tangibility i and LCFs j do not signicantly inuence the change in the capital structure of the acquiring companies during the deal period according to my ndings. Table 6 shows regression results for specications dealing with H4 about multinational companies' nancing decisions. The specications are based on Column (3) of Table 4 for the logit analysis and on Column (3) of Table 5 for the ordinary least square debt ratio analysis. The sample is restricted to acquirer companies belonging to a multinational group. The rst 3 columns contain logit regressions. In Column (1), I control for Grouptax, an indicator variable that equals one if the acquirer and the target are located in the same country and the target country applies a group taxation regime which allows an osetting of prots and losses of dierent entities within one group of companies for tax purposes. I interact this variable with the loss indicators for the acquirer and the target company in order to test if the osetting of potential losses of the target or the acquiring company are more relevant. The eect of consolidation opportunities on the probability to obseve a debt nanced deal should be positive if the acquirer might suer a loss after a debt nanced deal because of high extra interest expenses. If a protable acquirer company can lower its taxable income by using target loss carry-forwards as a non-debt tax shield, the need to nance the acquisition with debt for tax reasons is smaller. Thus, a negative eect is expected in this situation. Results do not indicate a statistically signicant relationship between a group taxation regime and the nancing decision of multinational acquirers. The reason might be that the loss indicators do not show the loss situation of past or future years. It might be, for example, that the target shows a tax loss carry-forward from periods more than one year ago that I do not observe. The table shows logit regressions with dependent variable Debt i,j in columns (1) to (3) based on column (3) of Table 4 and OLS regressions with dependent variable ∆ Debt i,j in columns (4) to (6) based on column (3) of Table 5 . Independent variables are dened in Table 10 . In Columns (1) and (4), I control for a potential group tax regime, in Columns (2) and (5), I test if the nancing decision is sensitive to the dierence between acquirer and target country tax rates, in Columns (3) and (6), I test if the weighted average tax rate of the multinational group inuences the nancing decision. All specications include acquirer-country-, year-and industry-xed eects. Standard errors are clustered on the acquirer-country-year level. P-values are shown in parentheses. * denotes signicance at the 10 %-level, * * at the 5 %-level and * * * at the 1 %-level.
In Column (2), I control for the dierence between the acquirer and the target country tax rate in cross border acquisitions, φτ C acq − τ C tar (for domestic acquisitions the variable equals zero). If this dierence is very high, the acquirer has an incentive to use debt for the deal nancing because acquisition costs (interest expenses) would reduce taxable income in the high tax country but acquisition gains (increased prots in the target company due to synergies) would be taxable in a low tax country. Results do not indicate a signicant impact of the tax rate dierential. This might be partly explained by the fact that it is not necessarily the aquiring company that has to bear the acquisition costs. The multinational can also take out a loan by a subsidiary in another high tax country and provide the capital in the form of equity to the acquiring entity. In order to test how tax rates from countries other than the acquirer country inuence the nancing decision of multinational groups, I use the mean tax rate of the acquiring multinational group, φτ C mean , instead of the acquirer country tax rate in Column (3). I weight this mean by the number of subsidiaries in the respective countries in order to approximate if the acquiring group is a high tax or low tax group. The coecient of φτ C mean is signicant and positive. Thus, the tax rates of other countries, in which ailiates of the multinationals are located, seem to inuence the nancing decisions as well. However, the average marginal eect of 1.10 is smaller compared to specications using φτ C acq of the acquirier country.
Columns (4) to (6) show results for the ordinary least square debt ratio analysis. In Column (4), I again control for a possible group taxation regime in the target countries (Grouptax2 equals 1 if at least one target is located in the same country like the acquirer and group taxation is possible). Results show that the change of the acquirer's debt ratio during the acquisition period is smaller if a tax consolidation is possible. This eect is only found for protable acquiring companies. The negative coecient of Grouptax2 indicates that protable acquirers which can use tax loss carryforwards of the target to lower their taxable income tend to abstain from highly debt nanced acquisitions. For loss making acquirers the eect is not signicant (using a test of joint signicance of Grouptax2 and LCF i * Grouptax2 ).
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In Column (5), I control for the dierence between the acquirer tax rate and the mean of the target tax rates in the considered year. Just like in the logit analysis, this variable does not inuence the nancing decision of the acquiring company.
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In Column (6), I test if the debt development of the acquiring company also depends on tax rates of aliates of the multinational group in other countries. In particular, I interact the acquirer tax rate φτ C acq and the average tax rate of aliates located outside the acqiuirer country, φτ C mean outside .
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The coecient of φτ C acq shows the eect if the mean of the aliates tax rates is zero. The negative interaction eect indicates, that the acquirer country tax rate eect decreases if the tax rate of other aliates increases. This can be explained by two reasons. Firstly, the incentive to reduce the taxable income of the acquiring company by debt nancing is higher if there are no other aliates in high tax counties where the debt would lead to higher tax savings. Secondly, if there are many low tax aliates in the group, the multinational has an incentive to provide an intragroup loan to the acquiring company by a low tax subsidiary for tax saving reasons. 35 However, this eect is not robust to a modication of Grouptax2. If this variable only equals one if at least one target company in the respective country shows a pre-deal loss, the signicance for protable acquirers disappear. This might be due to the inprecise measure of loss situations of target companies which relies on accounting gures of one year before the deal. 36 Results are similar if I use the minimum instead of the mean target company tax rates. 37 This mean is weighted by the numbers of aliates per country. For the tax rates of ailated companies I also use φτ Sensitivity analysis Table 7 presents sensitivity analyses for the logit approach on the basis of column (4) of Table 4 . The rst two columns split the sample in small and large deals using the median of the relative dealsize in percent of the acquirer size for separation.
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The large and signicant coecient of the tax variable for the larger deals and an insignicant coecient for the smaller deals indicate that it is especially the nancing decision in large deals which is inuenced by taxes.
In the third column I restrict the sample to observations where the acquirer has an initial debt ratio smaller than 75 % to capture that in many countries thin capitalization rules might restrict the deductibility of interest expenses from the corporate tax base if the leverage of the considered company is too high.
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In most countries applying such rules there is a save haven which is a pre-dened value for the debt to equity ratio. As long as companies stay below that value they do not have to be concerned about limitations of interest deductibility. In most countries this save haven amounts 3 to 1 or is even higher. Therefore, I try to exclude all rms that might be near a critical value before the acquistion takes place by only keeping those rms showing a debt to assets ratio smaller than 75 %. The coecient of φτ C acq remains positive and signicant. However, it is not larger compared to the coecient in Column (4) of Table 4 . 40 In specication (4), I drop all acquirer countries with observations in less than 3 years to control for outliers which does not change the results. In column (5) I introduce the personal taxation on the shareholder level in the analysis. The additional variables are the tax rate on dividend income, τ D acq and the tax rate on interest income from loans given to corporations, τ I acq . The eect of φτ C acq remains stable but the two additional variables have no signicant impact. The reason is either that personal taxation does not matter for most of the companies or that the shareholders are not liable to taxation in the country of the acquiring company. In column (6) I only look at observations with an independent 38 The number of observation is not identical for both samples because some observations have to be dropped due to collinearity problems when further reducing the sample. 39 Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008) , Hauer and Runkel (2012) and Buettner et al. (2010) analyze if thin capitalization rules result in a reduction of internal debt and weather this increases scal revenue. Dreÿler and Scheuering (2012) evaluate the eects of the introduction of a new thin capitalization rule in Germany in 2008. 40 I obtain similar results if I use other thresholds. The lower the threshold, the lower the coecient of φτ C acq . It would be desireable to nd out precisely how near a company is at a critical point in the considered country. However, many countries only restrict the deductibility of interest for internal loans or do not or not only look at the debt ratio to derive if a company is treated by thin capitalization rules or not. Since my data do not allow to distinguish between internal and external debt I only use this rough method to extract companies that should not be concerned about limitations. The table shows logit regressions with dependent variable Debt i,j based on column (4) in Table  4 . Independent variables are dened in Table 10 . Columns (1) and (2) split the sample in small and large deals. Column (3) restricts the sample to acquirers showing a pre-deal debt to assets ratio smaller then 75 %. In column (4), all acquirer countries with observations in less than 3 years are dropped. Column (5) introduces personal taxation into the analysis and column (6) restricts the sample to acquirers that are independent or do not have a global ultimate owner abroad. All specications include acquirer-country-, year-and industry-xed eects. Standard errors are clustered on the acquirer-country-year level. P-values are shown in parentheses. * denotes signicance at the 10 %-level, * * at the 5 %-level and * * * at the 1 %-level. acquirer or where the aquiring company does not have a global ultimate owner in another country in order to capture the last point. For those rms the coecients of the personal taxation variables should have signicant impact if it matters for the nancing decision. However, one limitation in my data is that I only observe the current ownership structure of the acquirer and not the data for the deal year. This can be the reason for the insignicant coecient of τ C acq in this specication.
In Table 7 , some independent variables lose signicance most likely due to the reduced sample sizes. The coecient of Initial debt i becomes positive and signicant in column (2). This might reect the debt capacity of the acquiring companies.
41 Table 8 provides results of analogous sensitivity analyses for the debt ratio regression (4) of Table 5 . Columns (1) and (2) again split the sample in smaller and larger deals. Now the median sum of dealvalues per acquirer and year as a percentage of the acquirers pre-deal total assets is used for separation. Remarkably, the coecient of the tax variable is not signicant in both of the samples although it had signicant impact in the whole sample.
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In column (3), the sample is reduced to acquirers showing a pre-deal debt ratio smaller than 75 %. The coecient of φτ C acq now is larger as compared to column (4) of Table  5 indicating that the tax advantage is more relevant for rms that are not too much indebted before the acquisition and therefore do not have to take into account a possible treatment by thin capitalization rules after a debt nanced deal. Column (4) restricts the sample to acquirer countries with observations in at least 3 years to control for outliers which does not change results qualitatively.
In column (5) and (6), I control for personal taxation at the shareholder level in the acquirer countries using τ D acq and τ I acq . The results indicate that personal taxation is not relevant for the nancing decision of the acquiring companies in my sample, even not for those that have no global ultimate owner abroad (compare column (6)).
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The control variables show similar coecients compared to Table 5 . The only dierence is that Ination acq shows a signicant positive coecient in Column (3). 41 This result is reverse to the ndings in the debt ratio analysis. However, the positive coecient here is only found for subsamples and is not robust to other specications. 42 When I separate according to the absolut rather than the relative size of the deals I nd that the tax variable has signicant impact only for the smaller deals. For the larger deals I do not nd signicant tax eects even when looking at dierent subgroups like the 25 % largest deals or the larger deals without the highest quantiles. 43 For such rms I argue that most personal shareholders should be resident in the country where the company is located. The table shows OLS regressions with dependent variable ∆ Debt i,j based on column (4) in Table  5 . Independent variables are dened in Table 10 . Columns (1) and (2) split the sample in companies acquiring relatively small and large targets. Column (3) restricts the sample to acquirers showing a pre-deal debt to assets ratio smaller then 75 %. In column (4) all acquirer countries with observations in less than 3 years are dropped. Column (5) introduces personal taxation into the analysis and column (6) restricts the sample to acquirers that are independent or do not have a global ultimate owner abroad. All specications include acquirer-country-, year-and industry-xed eects. Standard errors are clustered on the acquirer-country-year level. P-values are shown in parentheses. * denotes signicance at the 10 %-level, * * at the 5 %-level and * * * at the 1 %-level.
Comparison to Erickson (1998) and Dhaliwal et al. (2005) Erickson (1998) and Dhaliwal et al. (2005) use a trichotomous tax variable which directly captures if the acquirer is a loss making company by giving to it the value zero if the company has an operating loss and a negative taxable income before the deal and half of the statutory tax rate if one of the two conditions is fullled. Only if both characteristics indicate a protable rm, the tax variable equals the statutory tax rate.
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In Table 9 , I also employ such kind of variables for a better comparison with these former studies. In particular, I use three dierent dichotomous variables. All of them equal φτ C acq if the company is labeled as being protable and zero if not.
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Tax1 equals zero if the acquiring company does not have a positive prot before the acquisition, i.e. if LCF i equals 1. Tax2 equals zero if the pre-deal operating prot measured by the EBIT is negative. And Tax3 equals zero if the sum of all taxes relating to the pre-deal accounting period is less than or equal to zero. Columns (1) to (3) of Table 9 show results of logit specications employing these dichotomous variables instead of φτ C acq and using the full set of control variables. Only Tax1 shows a signicant coecient which is in line with ndings in Table 4 where the tax advantage of debt also especially aected the nancing decision of protable acquirers. However, the coecient is smaller using Tax1. Another dierence compared to Table 4 is that the loss dummy for the acquirer now gets a positive and signicant coecient. The reason might be that, controlling for the tax eect of the loss carry-forward, this variable captures that rms in dicult economic situations have to nance their investments through the capital market because they do not have many retained earnings and investors avoid to place their money in those companies. However, these ndings are not robust to the altered denitions of the dichotomous tax variable which can be seen in columns (2) and (3) of Table 9 .
Columns (4) to (6) depict the same specications for the debt ratio analysis. In these models none of the variables Tax1, Tax2 and Tax3 is found to signicantly inuence the nancing decision of acquiring companies. This is not surprising because we already see in Table 5 that the tax advantage seems not to dier between loss making and protable rms as described above. 44 The trichotomous tax variable was suggested by Graham (1996) . It equals "zero if the acquiring rm has net operating losses and a negative taxable income in the year prior to the acquisition, one-half the top statutory tax rate if the acquiring rm had either a net operating loss, or negative taxable income in the year prior to the acquisition, and the top statutory tax rate if the acquirer had neither a net operating loss nor negative taxable income in the year prior to the acquisition", compare Erickson (1998) , p. 285. The denition of this variable captures if the acquirer is near tax exhaustion. As an alternative measure, Erickson (1998) uses an indicator variable for a net operating loss. 45 I do not employ a trichotomous variable as I cannot observe the the companiess' taxable prot but only accounting gures. The table shows logit regressions with dependent variable Debt i,j in columns (1) to (3) based on column (3) of Table 4 and OLS regressions with dependent variable ∆ Debt i,j in columns (4) to (6) based on column (3) of Table 5 . Independent variables are dened in Table 10 . Columns (1) and (4) employ Tax1, columns (2) and (5) use Tax2 and column (3) and (6) All in all, I rather rely on results from Tables 4 and 5 because the dichotomous tax variables implicitly asume that the tax advantage of debt does only exist for rms which have taxable prots in the pre-deal period whereas by using φτ C acq and the loss dummy or an interaction I allow the data to decide about this issue.
For a better comparison of my results with ndings of Erickson (1998) I also conduct the logit analysis for modeling the probability to observe a debt nanced deal by employing another dependent variable, DebtB i,j . This variable sharper distinguishes between debt nanced deals and stock nanced acquisitions and is dened in Section 4.3. Results are presented in Tables 13 to 16 in the Appendix. Generally, all results regarding the tax variables are similar to the output presented in the last sections. However, the levels of signicance are lower using DebtB i,j . Some of the control variables lose signicance in several specications, for example Size i . In contrast, the signicance of other variables gets stronger, especially for Domestic credit acq and Stock market acq . However, I discussed the results of specications using Debt i,j due to the larger coverage of this variable. Another advantage of Debt i,j is that I include both kinds of equity nanced deals in the sample, nanced by own shares and nanced by retained earnings. Furthermore, I also employed DebtC i,j leading to qualitatively similar results, but I do not show them here because of the limited validity due to the very low numbers of observations (between 117 and 381 when including all control variables).
Conclusion
In this paper, I evaluate the eects of prot taxation on the nancing decision of corporate acquisitions. Due to the deductibility of interest expenses from the corporate tax base acquiring companies can save taxes by nancing a takeover with debt and afterwards osetting the interest expenses with prots in the following periods. For the empirical analysis I employ two approaches.
The rst approach deals with the particular decision how to nance the considered deal. Using information from ZEPHYR, a mergers and acquisitions database provided by Bureau van Dijk, I investigate the determinants of the question if a corporate acquisition should be nanced with debt or equity. My sample consists of 3717 deals with acquirers in 31 countries. I nd empirical evidence for the hypothesis that companies in high tax countries rather use debt than acquirers in low tax countries. This eect can especially be carved out for protable acquirers. Problems regarding this kind of analysis might be that I do not observe how much debt is used and that the nancing decision of acquisitions may not be independent from other investments of the same company around the deal.
Therefore, in a second step, I investigate the whole capital strucure development of the acquiring companies during the deal period. According to my ndings, the change of the debt to assets ratio is 0.55 %-points higher if the tax advantage of debt increases by one %-point. However, I cannot accept the hypothesis that the tax advantage is relevant especially for protable acquirers. Since the simple loss indicator variable does not contain information about the future development and the expectations of decision-makers, this result is not surprising. Even loss making rms might be very protable in the future and consequently have an incentive to decrease taxable prots by additional interest expenses.
All in all, the nancing decision in corporate acquisitions seems to be inuenced by prot taxation leading to a larger fraction of debt nancing in high tax countries. This can lead to economic distortions, for example the execution of acquisitions that would not be protable in a world without interest deductibility. 
Appendix

Tax1
Dichotomous variable, = φτ C acq if acquirer's pre-deal prot before tax is larger than zero and zero otherwise.
Tax2
Dichotomous variable, = φτ C acq if acquirer's pre-deal EBIT is larger than zero and zero otherwise.
Tax3
Dichotomous variable, = φτ C acq if acquirer's pre-deal taxation is larger than zero and zero otherwise.
Grouptax
Indicator variable, equals one if the acquirer and the target company are located in the same country and the target country applies a group taxation regime.
to be continued on the next page Weighted average tax rate of the whole multinational group in the acquisition year, the mean is weighted by the numbers of aliates per country.
Grouptax2
Indicator variable, equals one if at least one target company is located in the acquirer country and group taxation is possible.
Dierence between the acquirer country tax rate and the average tax rate of the targets aquired in the considered period.
Weighted average tax rate of all aliates outside the acquirer country, the mean is weighted by the numbers of aliates per country.
Ln Dealvalue j Logarithm of the dealvalue of the acquisition in thousand EUR. For the debt ratio analysis the logarithm of the sum of values of all acquisitions undertaken by the acquirer in the considered year is used (Ln Dealvalues j ).
Size i Logarithm of the acquirer's pre-deal total assets in thousand EUR.
Initial debt i
Acquirer's pre-deal debt to assets ratio.
LCF i
Indicator variable, equals one if the acquirer's pre-deal book prot before tax is lower than zero and zero if it is equal or larger than zero.
Ination acq Consumer price index in percent in the completion year of the acquisition.
Domestic credit acq Domestic credit provided by banking sector in percent of GDP in the completion year of the acquisition.
GDP growth acq Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices in the completion year of the acquisition.
Stock market acq Market capitalization of listed companies in percent of GDP in the completion year of the acquisition.
Distress i = (1.2 * working capital + 3.3 * EBIT + 1.0 * sales)/total assets, predeal value for the acquirer, following Altman (2000) and MacKie-Mason (1990) .
D&A i
Acquirer's pre-deal depreciation and amortization as a fraction of total assets.
∆ D&A i Acquirer's change in depreciation and amortization as a fraction of total assets in the completion year of the acquisition compared to the pre-deal value.
Tangibility i Acquirer's pre-deal tangible assets as a fraction of total assets.
to be continued on the next page ∆ Tangibility i Acquirer's change in tangible assets as a fraction of total assets in the completion year of the acquisition compared to the pre-deal value.
Protability i Acquirer's pre-deal EBITDA as a fraction of total assets.
∆ Protability i Acquirer's change in EBITDA as a fraction of total assets in the completion year of the acquisition compared to the pre-deal value.
LCF j Indicator variable, equals one if the target's pre-deal book prot before tax is lower than zero and zero if it is equal or larger than zero. For the debt ratio analysis this indicator equals one if at least one of the acquired targets shows a negative income (LCFs j ). number of observations per country for the analysis of the probability to observe a debt nanced deal using Debt i,j as the dependent variable. Columns (1) and (2) show the respective numbers for the base specication (1) of Table 4 . Columns (3) and (4) refer to specication (3) of Table 4 , which includes all control variables. Columns (5) and (6) depict numbers for specication (4) of Table 4 , which restricts the sample to protable acquirers. (2) show the respective numbers for the base specication (1) of Table 5 . Columns (3) and (4) refer to specication (3) of Table 5 , which includes all control variables. Columns (5) and (6) depict numbers for specication (4) of Table  5 , which restricts the sample to protable acquirers. The table shows logit regressions with dependent variable DebtB i,j . Independent variables are dened in Table 10 . Column (1) is the baseline regression. Column (2) restricts the sample to observations where additional control variables are not missing and column (3) adds these controls. In column (4), the sample only consists of protable acquiring companies and in column (5) an interaction term between φτ C acq and LCF i is used to identify a dierence in the tax eect for loss making and protable rms. All specications include acquirer-country-, year-and industry-xed eects. Standard errors are clustered on the acquirer-country-year level. P-values are shown in parentheses. * denotes signicance at the 10 %-level, * * at the 5 %-level and * * * at the 1 %-level. The table shows logit regressions with dependent variable DebtB i,j based on column (3) of Table 13 . Independent variables are dened in Table 10 .
In Column (1), I control for a potential group tax regime, in Column (2), I test if the nancing decision is sensitive to the dierence between acquirer and target country tax rates, in Column (3), I test if the weighted average tax rate of the multinational group inuences the nancing decision. All specications include acquirer-country-, year-and industryxed eects. Standard errors are clustered on the acquirer-country-year level. P-values are shown in parentheses. * denotes signicance at the 10 %-level, * * at the 5 %-level and * * * at the 1 %-level. The table shows logit regressions with dependent variable DebtB i,j based on column (4) in Table  13 . Independent variables are dened in Table 10 . Columns (1) and (2) split the sample in small and large deals. column (3) restricts the sample to acquirers showing a pre-deal debt to assets ratio smaller then 75 %. In column (4), all acquirer countries with observations in less than 3 years are dropped. Column (5) introduces personal taxation into the analysis and column (6) restricts the sample to acquirers that are independent or do not have a global ultimate owner abroad. All specications include acquirer-country-, year-and industry-xed eects. Standard errors are clustered on the acquirer-country-year level. P-values are shown in parentheses. * denotes signicance at the 10 %-level, * * at the 5 %-level and * * * at the 1 %-level. The table shows logit regressions with dependent variable DebtB i,j based on column (3) of Table 13 . Independent variables are dened in Table  10 . Column (1) employs Tax1, column (2) uses Tax2 and column (3) applies Tax3 instead of φτ C acq . All specications include acquirer-country-, year-and industry-xed eects. Standard errors are clustered on the acquirer-country-year level. P-values are shown in parentheses. * denotes signicance at the 10 %-level, * * at the 5 %-level and * * * at the 1 %-level.
